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1

INTRODUCTION

Since 1975, attempts at international coordination and cooperation1
between the major industrial countries have focused on annual economic
summit meetings of their chief executives. The current participants in
these meetings are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada—collectively called the Summit
Seven (S-7), when represented by their heads of government, or the
Group of Seven (G-7), when meeting at the financial minister level.
Although international communication and collaboration is an everyday
affair for officials in the executive departments and central banks of these
countries, summit meetings are unique. Summits are normally the only
occasions when the chief executives of the seven major industrial
countries meet as a group to discuss economic policy, and they are
highly visible events that produce for public scrutiny an economic
declaration of the collective considerations and actions to which the
participants commit their countries.
To assess the credibility of the commitments and prognostications
made at these summits, judged by the degree to which they have been
fulfilled, this study sifts through the economic declarations issued at
the fifteen summit meetings from 1975 to 1989. Such an assessment is
1
International collaboration or cooperation, on the one hand, and coordination, on
the other, have been distinguished in different ways. Some political scientists distinguish
collaboration from coordination on the basis of the creation of a common good versus
the prevention of common harm. Stein (1982, p. 312), for instance, writes that, “regimes
established to deal with the dilemma of common interests differ from those created to
solve the dilemma of common aversions. The former require collaboration, the latter
coordination.” Economists frequently intend the reverse reference (see Kenen, 1989, pp.
11-12, and Branson, 1990, p. 60). They thus assign the terms “collaboration” or “cooperation” to information exchange designed to prevent unnecessary miscalculations (common
harm) and “coordination” to activities leading toward the production of a significant
change of national policies in recognition of international economic interdependence
(common good).
The declarations of economic summits, however—and our study, in turn—tend not to
distinguish firmly between coordination and cooperation, using at times one as an
instance of the other. The 1988 Toronto declaration, for example, contains the sentence,
“International cooperation involves more than coordination of macroeconomic policies”
(Hajnal, 1989, pp. 364-365; all quotations from summit documents are taken from
Hajnal).

1

difficult because the mutual commitments of countries are couched in
the fuzzy language of diplomacy and state action (Ruggie, 1982, p. 380).
It is hard to evaluate the significance of promises that are not directly
enforceable—particularly those left intentionally vague—and to know
why they are made public. If the promises and forecasts contained in
summit declarations should prove to be unfathomable or largely empty,
it will be difficult to view the process culminating in their declarations
as setting recognized patterns around which substantive expectations
can converge. The summit process will then be seen to have little
significance as an institution generating explicit agreements (see Krasner,
1982, p. 186, and Keohane, 1984, p. 8).
Careful examination, however, shows that many summit undertakings
have been precise enough to be verifiable. We find a total of 209 such
instances in the economic declarations issued from 1975 to 1989, and
we can score the degree of compliance with them even though many of
the declarations were fuzzy and imposed obligations that were imprecise.
The overwhelming impression derived from the scores reported by
summit, country, and issue is that governments do not play it safe. Their
leaders’ concern about maintaining credibility in all areas appears to be
not so great as to prevent them from entering into commitments their
countries are unlikely to keep. It may not be a question of commitments
made in bad faith but of compliance impeded by lack of control. Thus,
pledges on the use of instruments, which the government is supposed
to have at its disposal, are found to be as unreliable as undertakings in
the nature of forecasts or prognostications about endogenous economic
events. These are undertakings that relate to outcomes without specifying
supporting policies or acts of international coordination.
Commitments that are made public and then honored to a substantial
degree will be credible but not necessarily newsworthy, beneficial, or
important.2 Credibility is only the precondition, not a guarantee, for
2
Indeed, there are theoretically “many circumstances under which coordination
worsens rather than improves economic performance” (Fischer, 1988, p. 39). Oudiz and
Sachs (1984; 1985); Hughes Hallett (1986); Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988);
Currie, Holtham, and Hughes Hallett (1989); Frankel (1990); and Ghosh and Masson
(1991) consider the full scope of international coordination and whether or not coordination pays. Principals in the process usually claim that it pays, but they do not present
supporting evidence or reveal their standards of appraisal.
Rogoff (1985) and Vaubel (1985) view international cooperation as involving collusion
among governments that could be counterproductive by exacerbating credibility problems and shielding each country from (currency) competition. Similarly, Taylor (1985)
finds that cooperative policy rules for the G-7 countries are more accommodative to
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economic declarations to have an effect on the justified expectations of
governments and private agents and on the confidence with which they
act. Determining whether this precondition holds is an essential and
hitherto neglected first step in empirical research on economic summit
declarations and on similar public documents of explicit international
cooperation. It shows whether the outlook or policy commitments
contained in the carefully negotiated declarations may matter because
they are credible, not that they do matter.
Although the verdict differs somewhat by summit and issue, we
conclude that the credibility of summit undertakings must generally be
rated low. The statistical work in the Appendix supports this conclusion
by deriving the critical population values for average scores that are too
low to refute the joint null hypotheses of “no summit ambition” and
“no summit effect.”3 Although the combined scores for all summits
and functional areas are statistically significant at the 5-percent or
higher level, average scores in most of the nine areas and in disaggregation by country are too low to reject the joint null.
To reject this joint hypothesis, however, is not necessarily to dismiss
the summit process as a whole, for it may generate other, less publicized, products. In the words of one recent economic declaration,
summits “have proven an effective forum to address the issues facing
the world economy, promote new ideas, and develop a common sense
of purpose” (Hajnal, 1989, pp. 362-363). If this is so, summits can be
useful even if they do not lead to policy commitments.
We discuss the several products of summit meetings and issues of
credibility in Chapter 2. The decisions and procedures used in scoring
compliance with commitments—including partial credit for those only
partly met—and in interpreting and quantifying verbal, nonnumerical,
commitments are explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 considers which
issues become the subjects of commitments at summits, and why, and
Chapter 5 explains the procedures used to assess the significance of the
inflation than noncooperative policy rules. Hoskins (1989, p. 5) also cautions that policies
of international coordination “often seek to supplant markets and to avoid market
discipline, risking enormous costs in terms of real economic growth and efficiency.”
This study takes no position on these matters. It seeks only seeks to ascertain whether
explicit coordination reflected in a public document can matter because it is credible.
3
As conceptualized in Chapter 5 for stochastic variables, summit ambition is measured by the amount, expressed in standard deviations, by which the expected value of a
variable named in a summit undertaking is to be shifted. Summit effect is the size of the
impulse actually given, which is equal to the expected displacement of such a variable
measured in the same way.

3

scores awarded for relative compliance with commitments made. The
results for the fifteen annual summits from 1975 to 1989 are reported
in Chapter 6. Concluding remarks are given in Chapter 7.

4

2

SUMMIT PRODUCTS AND ISSUES OF CREDIBILITY

The summit process can promote international collaboration at several
levels, with credibility as the key to its significance, particularly if the
process is seen to crest in the final declarations ratified by heads of
state. Even if the entire process is driving toward these declarations,
however, as has often been claimed (see Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p. 53,
and Hajnal, 1989, p. xxxi), useful byproducts may be generated along the
way. We shall describe several such possible byproducts before outlining
the nature of the commitments in the economic declarations.
Usually at least a year in advance of a summit, an individual, known
as a sherpa, is designated by each country to represent the head of its
government in coordinating and directing its preparations leading up to
the summit meeting. In the early stages of planning, each of the seven
sherpas first ascertains what concerns his government wishes to emphasize
and what issues it cares most to raise with other governments. This is
done through interagency consultations and working groups, checking
with principals as needed. Once agreement has been reached within a
government on the directions to be taken, they are translated into the
drafts and messages exchanged with other governments. Putnam and
Bayne (1987, p. 53) note that some sherpas feel their preparatory activity
becomes “substantively focused and precise only when participants
[are] forced to confront language encapsulating alternative approaches
to underlying problems.” The resulting exchanges may provide each
country with new information about the positions foreign governments
take on existing and developing issues, which issues they desire to take
up, and where they want to carry them. Mutual attunement and
compromise can then develop as issues begin to be crystallized for
summit debate and for drafting the declaration.
In the intensive stages of communication leading up to the summit,
opportunities for mutual gain or for the mutual reduction or prevention
of adverse international spillovers may be discovered. If these opportunities engage the interest of the political actors, they may widen the
scope for coordination. Such benefits remain highly conjectural, however,
because summit participants rarely point to or credit such discoveries.
Although the accepted public rationales for concerted action are
modified from time to time, changes in rhetoric do not necessarily
indicate that new insights have been brought to bear on a specific,
5

publicly announced program. Hence, it is difficult to document the
discovery of new opportunities for agreement or to pinpoint their
effect on policy planning in the process of international coordination.
More likely, summits may increase the degree to which governments
can capitalize on “old” opportunities by overcoming political obstacles.
For instance, the external support as well as peer pressure generated in
conjunction with a summit may free some governments from the
myopia imposed by political insecurity. The ability to stick with plans
such as a sustained lowering of the inflation rate or of fiscal deficits
may be enhanced to the point of bringing opportunities for national
action within reach. Inside observers such as Ostry (1990, p. 12)
regularly emphasize these opportunities to “get your own house in
order and the international economy will take care of itself.” In these
instances, international coordination may help to overcome domestic
political obstacles (see Atlantic Council of the United States, 1980, p.
31, and Dobson, 1991, p. 35), stiffen a government’s spine, and move it
to apply a decently low social discount rate in planning investments in
the future welfare of its nation.
Whether such coordination is appreciated depends on the degree to
which day-to-day political pressures have prevented a government from
adopting the strategic positions to which it ultimately aspires, and
whether international peer pressure is viewed as helpful in this regard.
Opportunities for active coordination may thus be contingent on one or
more governments finding themselves out of position and seeking to
lower the costs of changing course and adjusting their economic policies
and structures. Even if such conditions are exceptional, the contingent
risk-reduction and damage-control services offered by the summit
process can be stabilizing on a continuing basis.
Prominence and Credibility
The summit process can thus be beneficial in several ways at many levels.
But what is most distinctive about the process is the direct involvement
of heads of state, and their ability, through joint public announcements,
to affect the expectations of economic actors. That ability is predicated
on credibility, and credibility is derived from prior demonstrated
competence and truthfulness in describing the shape of things to come.
There is no doubt that heads of state strive to be credible to each
other because mutual credibility lowers transaction costs and permits
more confident exchange of obligations. Putnam and Bayne (1987, pp.
5 and 88) and Kahler (1988, p. 388) have noted that the higher the
level of the negotiators, the greater the costs of reneging on any
6

agreements. “That, of course, is why deals struck at the summit are
inherently more credible,” Putnam and Henning (1989, p. 100) have
claimed. This issue cannot be settled simply by prior reasoning, however,
because it is precisely those who are expected to be truthful who may
be able to deceive for temporary gain.
Governments need not rate each others’ credibility solely or predominantly by the extent to which each has kept its public promises; they
may have private knowledge of one another’s intentions and capabilities.
The public, however, must evaluate announcements by drawing on
general beliefs about the policymakers and the preferences, principles,
capabilities, and strategies thought to guide them. Those beliefs will
have been informed by observing the veracity of previous announcements in similar policy environments.
Credibility depends not only on the player but also on the issue, so
one must examine exactly what has been promised and what achieved.
Having a good reputation in one domain need not spell credibility in
another. If the Swiss National Bank, for example, were to announce
that it stands ready to support an active stimulation policy even at
grave risk to the maintenance of price stability, such an announcement
would probably not be credible but would, instead, presage personnel
changes at the central bank. Indeed, announcements in some areas
have as little effect on expectations when made by governments with
strong and unshakable reputations as when made by governments
known to say one thing and do another.
There are numerous books and papers on what international cooperation
could achieve if it were run by this or that model and game plan;
Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) provide a comprehensive assessment.
Attempts to characterize what has actually followed from cooperation and
how its alleged achievements have been connected to promises or actions
resulting from coordination are much rarer. Dobson (1991), in giving
her own expert description and summary appraisals of coordination in
recent years, refers to almost all the earlier English-language publications that have attempted to judge that process and its accomplishments.
In empirical work on the problems of credibility and political incapacity, strategic issues involving time inconsistency and the absence of
precommitment generally receive far less emphasis than the constraints
imposed by economic technology and the political climate. According
to the critical survey of the literature on policy credibility by Blackburn
and Christensen (1989), this is as it should be. The area that offers the
greatest scope for future research is, they say, “undoubtedly empirical”
(p. 41).
7

The concept of credibility that can be linked to the gap between
promise and performance is what Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) have
called “average credibility.” Average credibility is lower the wider the
absolute difference between the targets or actions announced and the
outcome expected by private agents. If the expected outcome is what
actually happens on average, a performance gap translates into a
credibility gap. The trouble is that average credibility as represented by
the above measure can be raised both by increased effort to meet a
target and by making an undertaking less ambitious. Thus, announcing
an undertaking quite devoid of ambition and doing nothing to change
the inertial outcome or solution for the economic variable in question
would be one way of earning the highest score for average credibility:
the expected performance gap between “no effort or effect promised”
and “nothing done” is 0.
Although we also compare actual to promised outcomes to derive
our performance scores, Chapter 5 and the Appendix explain that we
do so, not in any simple way, but by making explicit reference to the
degree of ambition or the range over which a variable is to be moved.
As a result, the average value of the score assigned to all undertakings
that are without ambition and systematic effect is expected to be 0
under our scheme, and not 1, which would be the highest value.
Hence, our scoring scheme avoids the ambiguity of Cukierman and
Meltzer’s (1986) average credibility; it comes closer to their concept of
marginal credibility.
According to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986, pp. 48-49), marginal
credibility measures the effect of a unit change in the target announced
for some variable on the expected value of that variable. If the actual
change turns out to be a fairly stable fraction of the announced change
on average, and this situation can be expected to continue, the degree
of marginal credibility may be given by that fraction.
It turns out that economic declarations frequently refer to intended
improvements, that is, changes in the levels of some variables. Their
language implies that the changes are to be measured simply from the
present, rather than relative to the counterfactual outcome that would
be expected without coordinated action. The goal in some cases appears
to be a return to the status quo ante, if matters have deteriorated
since. In the case of variables known to be subject to drifts or trends,
the changes tend to apply to their rates of growth or to ratios of such
variables. Some useful examples are given in the next chapter, before
an overview of the areas in which commitments have been made.
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3

SCORING POLICY COMMITMENTS IN PRACTICE

Before characterizing summit commitments with an eye to scoring
compliance, we introduce here the metric used for scoring and explain
what key decisions must be made before it can be applied. Two hypothetical cases show how scores are set to indicate (1) the degree of
representativeness (or “membership”) of a full range of numerical
values characterizing a concept and (2) the degree of compliance with
accepted obligations:
(1) If the concept involved is merely descriptive of a change in a
variable but not suggestive of an undertaking, a membership function
will merely indicate how well any data is judged to match a particular
concept of change. It is easiest to characterize the whole range of such
possibilities, going from a score of −1 to 1 and back, with an example
on which we are all expert, the membership of different human ages in
the concept “getting old.” To what degree can a person of any age
claim membership in that concept so that its degree of membership
can be scored?
If a child proclaims on her fourth birthday that she is “getting old,”
the statement will be comical, for the membership of age four in the
class of such statements will be about as negative as possible (that is, −1).
If a thirty-year-old issues the same lament, it will no longer be funny
or deserve a negative score. Still, there may be broad agreement that
turning thirty is not what “getting old” normally brings to mind. Hence,
the appropriate membership score for age thirty might be around 0. If,
however, a sixty- or sixty-five-year-old says the same thing, we will say
that this is the “typical” person to make such a statement. Hence, the
membership score for ages sixty to sixty-five in the self-referential
statement “getting old” will be 1 or only a little less. It will be decidedly less than 1 at age ninety, because a ninety-year-old is normally
viewed as being old, not getting old. Indeed, if a very old person, say
one who is 110 years old, complains of getting old, the comical effect,
with a negative score, will reemerge.
Once the basic grid has been adopted, any age can be mapped into
the fuzzy concept, “getting old” by interpolation over the nonnegative
range and by using symmetry to score outcomes in the negative, or
contradictory, range. Technically, this process is assisted by choosing a
mathematical membership function and fitting it to the points where
9

scores 0 and 1 are thought to apply. The next example, drawn from
economics, shows what is involved in the choice of functional form and
the form actually chosen to derive the scores reported and analyzed in
this paper.
(2) Economic declarations frequently contain fuzzy obligations, and
negotiators understand that the obligations imposed should not be
viewed as all or nothing or black and white. Even if the relevant target
or goal is numerically precise, so that we can determine clearly whether
the obligation has been discharged in full, it might not be appropriate
to score performance on the undiscerning legalistic or disciplinarian
yes/no binary scale.1 A continuous numerical grading scheme is required
to obtain scores suitable for determining the average degree of compliance when judging the credibility of summit undertakings.
Assume, for instance, that a government commits itself publicly to a
“substantial reduction” in inflation for “next” year at a time when the
rate of inflation is running at 6 percent per annum. Suppose it can be
inferred from various data and policy clues behind this declaration that
a reduction will not be characterized as fully substantial, or deserve the
maximum score of 1, unless the inflation rate falls to 4 percent or less
by next year. If inflation does not fall at all (that is, it stays at 6 percent),
the score for inflation will be 0; if it rises, the score will be negative.
Indeed, an increase in inflation by 2 percentage points or more will, by
symmetry, be scored −1.
How, then, should one score intermediate outcomes, such as inflation
falling from 6 percent this year to 5 percent next year? The score
derived by linear interpolation will be 0.5. The score obtained with
another type of membership function evolved from the logistic function
(see Zimmermann, 1991, pp. 348-350) will be less than that (that is,
0.45), because it penalizes even small deviations quite heavily, taking
away more than half of the full score of 1 for falling only half short.2
Economists, however, tend to prefer quadratic penalty functions, which
penalize more heavily any given departure from the goal the farther
one has already moved away from it. They will assign a score greater
1
Binary evaluations of action programs are quite common. For a recent review of a
scheme of discrete but multidimensional scores per event that are ultimately compacted
to yield a binary evaluation of the results of economic sanctions in terms of success or
failure, see von Furstenberg (1991).
2
For a complete explanation of the nonlinear membership functions and the way they
are solved, see the appendix of the authors’ companion study (von Furstenberg and
Daniels, 1991, pp. 298-299).
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than 0.5 (that is, 0.75) to an inflation outcome of 5 percent because
they will give more credit for bringing inflation down from 6 percent to
5 percent than from 5 percent to 4 percent, if 4 percent is the goal.3
The compromise we strike between the legalistic membershipfunction approach, which presses for full compliance by harshly penalizing even small deviations, and the economic approach, which rewards
partial compliance by harshly penalizing large deviations, is to revert to
linear interpolation. Thus, 5-percent inflation, midway between 4 and
6, will receive a score of 0.5.
If inflation “overshoots” the objective and falls below 4 percent during
the period covered by a summit commitment, one other outcome can
possibly earn an intermediate score such as 0.5. The target of getting
inflation down to 4 percent next year can be regarded as the single
most desired outcome for the near term if the presence of nominally
fixed interest-rate and wage contracting in an economy has raised fears
that a steeper reduction in inflation will depress economic activity. In
that case, an outcome of 3-percent inflation for next year might be
given a score of 0.5 on the grounds that it is just as far away from the
interim ideal as is 5-percent inflation. If, however, reducing inflation to
less than 4 percent during the commitment period has been viewed as
an unmixed blessing, 3-percent inflation cannot score any lower than
4-percent inflation, meaning that it, too, will get the top score of 1.
Any intermediate score, such as 0.5, will then be assigned to just one
outcome, in this case to reducing the rate of inflation from 6 to 5
percent.4
Such a unique score can be interpreted in two, not necessarily
mutually exclusive ways. It can indicate that a reduction of the inflation
rate by 1 percentage point has a membership of 0.5 in the fuzzy
concept of a “substantial reduction” in that rate. Alternatively, if we
think we know what a “substantial reduction” of inflation was meant to
signify numerically or if the goal of reducing the rate of inflation to 4
percent was explicitly stated and publicly characterized as the “substan3
The squared deviation of 6 from 4 percentage points is 4, compared with 1 for the
squared deviation of 5 from 4 points. Hence, only a quarter of the maximum score of 1
is lost if the outcome is 5-percent rather than 4-percent inflation, with the remaining
three quarters lost if the outcome is 6 percent, that is, if it reflects no improvement.
4
In most areas, overfulfillment appears to be an unmixed blessing. For instance,
multi-year energy-conservation targets were surpassed without unwanted help from
cyclical decline or other negative side effects. For this reason, we have developed our
test statistics in the Appendix as if overshooting a target always receives the same
(perfect) score as hitting it.
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tial reduction” sought, the score of 0.5 would be interpreted as the
extent to which this obligation was met. Indeed, the need to interpret
the strength of obligations or the scheme for partial credit arises in
connection with both the crisp and fuzzy goals contained in economic
declarations. The difference between the two is that, when the goals
are not numerically specific, the process of scoring jointly characterizes
the membership of data in each of the goals and in the fuzzy obligations they impose. Such mapping is essential to prepare summit undertakings for accounting, monitoring, or scoring, and, ultimately, for
combining the scores by country or type of issue.
Four Examples from the 1978 Bonn Summit
We are now ready to show how these procedures have been applied to
summit undertakings.5 Our first two examples involve goals that are
crisp in describing the targets to be reached and the times specified for
reaching them. The third and fourth examples involve commitments
that are fuzzy about the goals to be achieved in a specified time frame
and the distance countries are to move in the directions prescribed. In
spite of their fuzziness, however, both of these latter commitments
receive extreme scores, of 1 and −1, respectively. The fourth example
also shows that there can be uncertainty not just about the size of an
undertaking but also about the variable or variables to which the commitment may refer. These examples may help the reader decide whether
the judgments and procedures employed here are likely to lead to
scoring on which an assessment of credibility can reasonably be based.
(1) A U.S. Energy Commitment. The 1978 summit declaration said
that the United States “will increase coal production by two-thirds [by
1985].”6 Coal production rose from 14.08 quadrillion BTU in 1974 to
15.76 quadrillion BTU in 1977 (when production was interrupted by a
coal strike), then fell to 14.91 in 1978. Had the 3.8-percent average
annual rate of increase registered for 1974 through 1977, prior to the
commitment to accelerate production, continued for the next seven
years, coal production would have been 19.36 quadrillion BTU in 1985.
5
Examples are taken from a 126-page appendix (WP 5.1) detailing the scoring of the
209 measurable commitments found in the economic summit declarations from 1975 to
1989. Requests for this copyrighted material will be filled by Professor Joseph Daniels
(Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, Marquette University,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233) upon receipt of a formatted (IBM) diskette accompanied
by a suitable self-addressed return envelope.
6
This is the first of two commitments that can be scored independently even though
they were offered as subsidiary to the principal goal of reducing oil imports.
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This outcome is given a score of 0. A two-thirds increase from the 1978
level, by contrast, would have carried production to 24.85 quadrillion
BTU. This outcome is given a score of 1. Actual production in 1985
was 19.33 quadrillion BTU. Therefore, the linear score is (19.33 −
19.36)/(24.85 − 19.36), or −0.005.7
(2) A German Commitment to Fiscal Stimulus. The summit declaration said that, “by the end of August [the German Delegation] will
propose to the legislative bodies additional and quantitatively substantial measures up to 1 per cent of GNP. . . .” but hedged: “The order of
magnitude will take account of the absorptive capacity of the capital
market and the need to avoid inflationary pressures.” The hedge may
be viewed as rhetorical, however, for the fiscal measures were to be
taken so soon after the summit that there would be little time for new
data to develop that could greatly change the outlook prevailing at the
summit. Furthermore, the statement referred to additional fiscal policy
measures, not outcomes, that were to take effect in 1979. It did not
suggest that the measures taken should be judged by their impact on
the economy, but only by their impact on the budget.
Holtham’s (1989, p. 156) analysis of the fiscal package implemented
after the Bonn summit indicates that government expenditures increased
by about 0.25 percent of GNP in 1979, while tax cuts and allowances
were worth about 0.6 percent of GNP, for a total budgetary effect that
year of about 0.85 percent of GNP. Although we adopt Holtham’s
accounting, we note that the constant-activity-budget balances for the
entire public sector, which excludes the effect of cyclical fluctuations,
showed an increase in the deficit equal to only 0.6 percent of GNP
from 1978 to 1979 (see European Communities, 1980, p. 65.). In this
instance, a null change in the budget is given a score of 0, and a
package of new stimulative fiscal measures equal to 1 percent of GNP
is given a score of 1. Because the actual measures appear to have
amounted to 0.85 percent of GNP, the linear score is 0.850.
(3) A Commitment to Export Restraint by Japan. The summit declaration said that “the Government of Japan is . . . calling for moderation
in exports with the aim of keeping the total volume of exports for the
fiscal year of 1978 at or below the level of fiscal year 1977.” Real
exports were the likely objective of this undertaking. The amount of
the decrease intended was not made explicit but was assumed to be
7

We assume that the increase in coal production is more accurately and representatively measured in BTU than in short tons. The data used here are from the U.S.
Department of Energy (1987, p. 90).
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appreciable. Accordingly, Japan would have been unsuccessful if there
had been no fall in real exports, and this outcome is given a score of 0.
It is less clear, however, how large the decline in exports would have to
have been to constitute full success (for a score of 1).
The rate of growth in real exports during fiscal year 1977 (from
1977:I to 1978:I) was 6.03 percent, and during fiscal year 1978 (from
1978:I to 1979:I), −3.68 percent. This decline in exports occurred while
real GNP was growing at an annual rate of more than 5 percent, and it
implies a substantial shift in the composition of aggregate demand from
foreign to domestic sources. Because the undertaking was fulfilled, the
score of 1 is assigned to the actual outcome.
(4) A Multi-Country Commitment to Greater Exchange-Market
Stability. The summit declaration said that the participating countries
must “achieve greater stability in exchange markets.” As will be discussed further, although the weakness of the dollar against other major
currencies may have been the prime concern, there is no language in
the summit declaration that would allow one to infer specific exchangerate targets that can be scored. Casting goals in terms of exchange-rate
variability, instead, can still encompass concerns about the level of key
exchange rates if, for instance, continued or increasing weakness of the
dollar is understood to contribute to their instability. We therefore
interpret the commitment to achieve greater stability in exchange
markets in terms of the variance of daily exchange-rate changes for the
currencies of the seven countries. Specifically, we take it to mean that,
compared with the period between the 1977 and 1978 summits, the
variance of daily exchange-rate changes was to be reduced between the
currencies of the seven summit countries during the next intersummit
period from 1978 to 1979.
As the first column in Table 1 shows, the average variance of daily
exchange-rate changes was smaller in the period just before the 1978
Bonn summit than at any other time since June 1, 1973, shortly after
the widespread adoption of floating. It would thus be unrealistic to
expect much more reduction, certainly no more than 20 or 30 percent.
Therefore, a further reduction by 25 percent after the Bonn summit is
given a score of 1.
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VARIANCE

Period

OF

TABLE 1
DAILY EXCHANGE RATES FOR CONSECUTIVE PERIODS, 1973-1990
(based on percentage rates of change)
Number of
DM/¥ Observations

Average

$/¥

$/DM

$/£

DM/£

¥/£

6/1/73 11/14/75

0.292

0.185

0.456

0.169

0.356

0.285

0.478

620

11/18/75 6/25/76

0.262

0.026

0.084

0.280

0.345

0.308

0.088

158

6/29/76 5/6/77

0.204

0.071

0.086

0.326

0.522

0.396

0.122

223

5/9/77 7/14/78

0.193

0.230

0.278

0.251

0.172

0.271

0.189

309

7/18/78 6/27/79

0.316

0.578

0.358

0.341

0.192

0.386

0.283

244

7/2/79 6/20/80

0.370

0.490

0.330

0.420

0.304

0.687

0.490

245

6/24/80 7/17/81

0.427

0.420

0.559

0.448

0.376

0.516

0.449

268

7/22/81 6/3/82

0.448

0.553

0.606

0.594

0.339

0.470

0.292

220

6/7/82 5/27/83

0.375

0.568

0.408

0.389

0.258

0.398

0.185

249

5/31/83 6/6/84

0.241

0.199

0.370

0.284

0.218

0.270

0.184

259

6/11/84 5/1/85

0.464

0.222

0.671

0.897

0.218

0.507

0.286

226

5/6/85 5/2/86

0.656

0.494

0.780

0.960

0.370

0.754

0.399

252

5/7/86 6/5/87

0.398

0.464

0.569

0.391

0.392

0.400

0.256

271

continued on next page
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TABLE 1
continued

Period

Average

$/¥

$/DM

$/£

DM/£

¥/£

Number of
DM/¥ Observations

From Summit Before Plaza to Summit After Louvre
5/6/85 9/19/85

0.700

0.243

0.852

1.190

0.207

0.714

0.430

95

9/23/85 5/2/86

0.523

0.520

0.576

0.623

0.467

0.743

0.364

155

5/7/86 2/20/87

0.428

0.481

0.644

0.392

0.409

0.409

0.285

200

2/23/87 6/5/87

0.311

0.419

0.358

0.381

0.317

0.374

0.163

70

6/11/87 6/17/88

0.300

0.505

0.372

0.482

0.152

0.261

0.151

256

6/22/88 7/13/89

0.354

0.495

0.481

0.528

0.187

0.219

0.201

269

7/17/89 7/6/90

0.297

0.363

0.371

0.339

0.222

0.342

0.294

247

The variances of daily exchange-rate changes shown in Table 1 were
calculated from the bid-price spot quotations at the close of the London
market, working with nine bilateral rates.8 The six most important of
these are shown separately in the table, but the averages in the first
column pertain to all nine rates (including the U.S. dollar prices of the
Canadian dollar, French franc, and Italian lira). The averages are
8
Changes in exchange rates were calculated as differences in the logarithms from
trading day to trading day, excluding all days for which complete exchange-rate quotations were not available, and then multiplied by 100 to express instantaneous rates of
change in percent. This procedure is appropriate if, in high-frequency data, exchange
rates are a random walk, possibly with minuscule trend (compared with the size of daily
variations). The calculation of changes went to the last trading day before a summit or
G-5 and G-7 agreement and resumed on the first trading day after it. This was done to
keep the variances of daily exchange-rate changes, which are used to measure volatility
between meetings, from including any immediate effects on the level of exchange rates
of the announcements at those meetings. The exchange-rate quotations used were taken
from the data service DRIFACS.
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period after Bonn but, instead, increased by 64 percent over the
variance in the preceding period, the score for this undertaking is −1.
This extreme negative score is appropriate because the actual growth in
exchange-rate instability was clearly greater than the intended reduction.
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4

MACROECONOMIC DISTRESS AND THE CHOICE OF
SUMMIT ISSUES

Having explained the rationale and procedures for scoring summit
undertakings, we give here an overview of the commitments in the
various areas and the ways in which they may have come about. Summit
declarations are not rungs in a Jacob’s Ladder pointing upward to
continuous improvement in the economic performance of the S-7
countries. Rather than orchestrating and marshaling a cumulative
process, they report on the latest economic discomforts and crises and
on the measures countries resolve to take about them in the months
following the meetings. Summits provide an elevated stage for national
governments wishing to be seen as actively confronting current problems,
and doing so jointly. They are designed to build confidence and to
exchange assurances that any give and take is for the good of all.
Hence, unresolved problems, revealed by the data, should pinpoint the
areas in which commitments might be expected at the following summit.
The data from 1974 to 1989 thus need to be examined to infer what
may have prompted the particular undertakings that will be evaluated
in the next chapter.
Issues Subject to Commitments at Summits
Theories have been proposed and tested about the changing degrees to
which individual countries have dominated the agenda of the economic
summits (see, for example, Eichengreen, 1989, and, more specifically,
Bergsten, 1990, and Herz and Starbatty, 1990). Rather than trace the
changing economic pressures and particular interests that can be
deduced from each country’s own economic data, we develop an overall
picture composed by summing the information for all S-7 countries,
using their GNP or GDP weights. Such a picture may help spot the
issues that will be highlighted in the summit declarations under various
economic circumstances. The political assumption implicit in this crude
weighting is that the degree of attention given a problem is proportional
to the economic size of the S-7 country or countries in which it occurs.
The principal macroeconomic concerns that countries bring to
summit meetings are similar to those that move them domestically, but
the weights may well be different. Inflation, unemployment, and
economic growth head the list, even though inflation is attributable
18

principally to national rather than international developments and does
not show a high degree of covariance among the S-7 countries, except
during years dominated by energy shocks. Movements in real interest
rates are more immediately and inevitably shared internationally, just
as exchange-rate volatility or misalignments affect all. In addition,
specifically international issues, such as unsustainable current-account
imbalances, are tailor-made for the summits.
National policy matters, such as fiscal imbalances, also appear on
summit agendas. The reasons for international attention may be several.
Fiscal expansion in a major country is presumed to put upward pressure
on real interest rates and to affect exchange rates.1 This presumption
appears to have fit the United States from 1982 to 1985 and Germany
in 1990 and 1991, although other data links are conceivable (see Sachs
and Wyplosz, 1984). Abrupt changes in capital and trade flows would
then interfere with economic growth and stability objectives, including
those of heavily indebted developing countries (see Dornbusch, 1985,
and Marris, 1985). Furthermore, the external “twin” of a fiscal deficit,
whether or not begotten by real appreciation of a country’s currency,
can give rise to an unsustainable external imbalance and to pressures
for protection from foreign competition.2 In some countries, such as
Italy, large and chronic fiscal deficits may also raise the prospect of
unsustainable growth in net public debt relative to GNP and may
presage adverse supply-side consequences from higher inflation taxes
and increased marginal tax rates (see Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini, 1990).
Unlike fiscal measures, money-supply growth is never explicitly
targeted in summit undertakings. Central banks have sought to keep
their distance from the summit process, the agendas of which are
prepared mostly in finance ministries or treasury departments. Even
the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors, meeting as
needed between summits, have concerned themselves only indirectly
with money-supply growth, typically in conjunction with intervention or
other means to foster exchange-rate objectives.3
1
Reference to the original Mundell-Fleming model is frequently made to support this
view. For extensions, see Dornbusch (1987) and Frenkel and Razin (1987). On global
linkages between interest rates and government debt, see also Tanzi and Lutz (1990).
2
On the persistence of the U.S. external imbalance from 1980 to 1987, and the
relation between the fiscal and external deficits, see Krugman and Baldwin (1987),
Hooper and Mann (1989), and Helliwell (1991).
3
Economic declarations stop well short of making prescriptions for money-supply
growth; indeed, they usually skirt any explicit reference to monetary policy. The 1987
Venice summit declaration provided a partial exception in this regard by urging that
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Outside the areas of fiscal and energy policy, summit undertakings
relate to broad dimensions of economic performance. These dimensions
embrace ultimate objectives that matter politically, not the specific
means envisaged to improve performance. Any sharp deterioration in
economic conditions, no matter what its cause, is likely to trigger
summit undertakings vowing to improve those conditions, thereby
casting heads of government in an active, remedial role.
If summit interventions are triggered by increased popular dissatisfaction with some important aspect of economic performance, one
would expect bad news about a social good to be followed by summit
commitments. Table 2 provides the collective record in this regard for
seven key variables arranged roughly in order of importance. These are
inflation and unemployment rates, real growth and real interest rates,
public indebtedness and absolute current-account balances as percentages
of GNP, and an index of the relative price of crude oil. An asterisk
next to a number indicates that undertakings in that area at that year’s
summit were sufficiently concrete to be scored.4 It may be noted that
growth rates, fiscal balances, balances of payments, and interest rates
are among the five indicators singled out by the G-7 in following up on
the 1987 Louvre Accord (for a more complete account of the development of indicators for surveillance in 1986 and 1987, see Frankel,
1990, pp. 122-123, and Dobson, 1991, pp. 47-49). Clearly, therefore,
the recently defined indicators coincide with the areas in which summit
commitments have traditionally been made.
The hypothesis that growing discomfort is followed by summit
undertakings most clearly fits for real interest rates, where undertakings could be scored during the period of record-high real interest
“monetary policy should also support non-inflationary growth and foster stability of
exchange rates,” but only in quite general terms. Earlier statements on the subject
tended to be even thinner. The Versailles summit declaration of 1982, for example, read:
“We are determined to see that greater monetary stability and freer flows of trade and
capital reinforce one another in the interest of economic growth and employment.”
4
The relation between the classification of data in order of presumed importance
shown here and the classification of undertakings used in Table 5 later in this paper is
obvious for (real GNP) growth, interest, and inflation rates, and for oil (energy).
Undertakings shown under ratio of debt to GNP (column 5) in Table 2 correspond to
those scored as fiscal adjustments in Table 5, except that fiscal stimulus promised at the
1978 Bonn summit is not indicated in Table 2. Undertakings under the ratio of currentaccount balance to GNP (column 6) in Table 2 correspond to those shown under
demand composition and international trade in Table 5; they all relate to the reduction
in current-account imbalances to be achieved in some surplus countries by stimulating
domestic demand.
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THE

Year

TABLE 2
MACROECONOMIC RECORD OF THE S-7 COUNTRIES COMBINED, 1974-1989
(rates of change, year over year, or annual rates, in percentages)

UnemployInflation
ment
(1)
(2)

Real
Growth
(3)

Real
Interest
Rate
(4)

Ratio of
Debt to
GNP
(5)

Ratio of
CAB to
GNP Oil Price
(7)
(6)

1974

14.0

3.6

0.2

1.2

n.a.

1.1

137

1975

10.6*

5.3

−0.2*

1.5

n.a.

0.9

122

1976

8.3*

5.4

4.9*

1.8

n.a.

0.6*

124

1977

*

8.0

5.3

*

4.2

1.1

n.a.

*

0.8

126

1978

6.9*

5.0

4.7*

0.4

n.a.

1.2*

118*

1979

8.2

4.9

3.6

1.2

20.7

0.5

161*

1980

10.7*

5.5

1.4*

4.5

21.5

0.7

252*

1981

*

9.0

6.3

*

1.9

7.7

22.6

0.7

254

1982

6.6*

7.7

−0.3*

8.1*

25.5

0.6

223

1983

4.9*

8.0

2.9

7.6*

28.2*

1.0

189

1984

4.2*

7.4

5.0*

8.3*

29.5*

1.7

176

1985

*

3.7

7.3

*

3.5

7.0

31.1

*

2.1

162

1986

2.1

7.3

2.7

4.9

32.6*

2.9

87

1987

3.0

6.8

3.5*

5.0

32.4*

2.9*

100

1988

2.8*

6.2

4.6

4.6

31.7*

2.5*

80

1989

*

4.0

*

*

91

3.8

5.7

3.3

30.6

*

2.3

NOTE: Aggregates and averages, where appropriate, were computed using 1987 GNP
or GDP weights expressed in U.S. dollars. Asterisks indicate undertakings sufficiently
concrete to be scored.
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES BY COLUMN:
(1) Percentage change in private consumption deflator from previous year (OECD, 1990,
p. 185).
(2) Unemployment rate under commonly used national definition (OECD, 1990, p. 193).
(3) Percentage change in real GNP or GDP from previous year (OECD, 1990, p. 175).
(4) Real long-term interest rate (OECD, 1989, pp. 15, 157, extended to 1989 using the
method described therein).
(5) Net public debt of the government as percentage of GNP or GDP (Chouraqui,
Hagemann, and Sartor, 1990, p. 21).
(6) Sum of absolute values of current-account balances of S-7 countries in current U.S.
dollars in percentage of corresponding sum of GNP or GDP (OECD, 1990, p. 184,
and IMF, various issues through January 1991).
(7) OECD U.S. dollar import price of crude oil divided by implicit U.S. GNP price
deflator and expressed as index 1987 = 100 (OECD, 1983, p. 75, 1990, p. 153, and
U.S. President, 1991, p. 290).

21

rates from 1982 to 1984. The second oil shock also triggered two years
of extensive energy commitments in 1979 and 1980. However, the set
of commitments issued at Bonn in 1978 was triggered, not by an
appreciable rise in the real price of oil, say, from 1976 to 1977, but by
unresolved problems resulting from the failure of the United States to
allow adjustment to the first oil shock through market means. That
shock had originally caused the index used here to triple from its level
of 45 in 1973.
Commitments in the fiscal area are split between commitments by
some countries to increase government investment or spending generally,
or to cut taxes, in order to stimulate domestic demand, and commitments
by other countries to do the reverse to get their government deficits
under control. Emphasis on fiscal restraint tended to broaden from
Bonn 1978 to Paris 1989, and it is this type of commitment to which
the statistics in column 5 of Table 2 relate. The frequency with which
increased fiscal restraint is promised, in good faith or bad, but in a
manner sufficiently specific to be scored, grows with the increase in
public indebtedness and then stays high. The same pattern can be
observed in column 6 for the sum of the absolute values of the currentaccount balances in the closing years of the 1980s.
This pattern suggests that not only a “derivative” correction criterion,
reacting to a change for the worse, but also an “integral” criterion,
reacting to the continuation of undesirable outcomes, may be at work
in shaping summit agendas. Derivative correction refers to leaning
against adverse developments or trends soon after they have become
apparent. Integral correction addresses the results of such adverse
changes, intensifying efforts to reverse them as long as the damage
persists. It gets to work once the storm has stopped but the house is
down. An integral restoration process is most evident with regard to
inflation, where any weighted-average rate in excess of 3 percent per
annum appears to have put the issue on the summit agenda—except in
the year 1979.
The exception in 1979 suggests why commitments one might normally
expect are not always made at particular summits. In 1979, the Saudi
benchmark price of crude oil was raised steeply on three occasions,
which together constituted the second oil shock. On June 28, the first
day of the Tokyo summit, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) agreed to raise the price of crude oil by 24 percent
to a minimum of $18 per barrel (the price actually rose to $28 by
January 1980). The OPEC announcement helped to create such inflation uncertainty as to discourage concrete commitments. Except,
22

perhaps, in the area of exchange-rate management, through which the
authorities may try to reduce uncertainty by limiting volatility (which is
both its cause and effect), an exceptionally high degree of uncertainty
may thus discourage commitments at the summits. A gloomy and
unusually uncertain economic outlook may also explain why there were
no specific commitments on economic growth in 1983. The weightedaverage unemployment rate reached its peak that year, but several of
the S-7 countries had not yet found the troughs of their recessions by
the time of the Williamsburg summit in late May, leaving growth
prospects for the year ahead very much in doubt.
Overall, these simple motives appear to explain quite well the ways in
which undertakings emerge from summit negotiations. The undertakings
reflect attempts to stop ongoing deterioration or to reverse its results,
so long as promising to do so in the near term does not appear foolhardy.
Two of the motives, derivative and integral correction, are reasons for
action, but exceptions may be made to avoid embarrassment; near-term
prospects may be so bleak as to inhibit commitments.
Before examining undertakings relating to exchange-rate stability,
one matter still requires comment. Absence of an asterisk on an issue
in Table 2 does not necessarily indicate that the issue played no role at
the summit that year, but only that it did not appear in the final text of
the economic declaration in a manner sufficiently specific to be scored.
Thus, the development of energy alternatives to crude oil was mentioned
after 1980—at the 1982 Versailles summit, for instance—but nothing
specific was promised. The large U.S. budget deficit was discussed at
the same summit, playing even a key role in the negotiations, according
to some close observers (see Herz and Starbatty, 1990, p. 19), but the
Versailles declaration contained only the bland stipulation that, “in
order to achieve this essential reduction of real interest rates, we will
as a matter of urgency pursue prudent monetary policies and achieve
greater control of budgetary deficits.”
Commitments to Stabilize Exchange Rates
The first call for greater exchange-rate stability scored in this study was
issued at the 1978 Bonn summit. At that time, there was intense
concern that exchange-rate volatility and uncertainty could be highly
detrimental to the volume and efficiency of international trade. Therefore, the reduction of exchange-rate instability around prevailing average
levels, not an adjustment of those levels, was the goal emphasized in
public. Later, the pursuit of exchange-rate stability was coupled with
attempts to guide exchange rates into sustainable ranges. Yet, summit
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declarations have tended to reflect such attempts only indirectly and
retrospectively, not in the form of commitments that could be scored.
The 1986 Tokyo declaration, for instance, noted that, “there has been
a significant shift in the pattern of exchange rates which better reflects
fundamental economic conditions.”
Episodes of active exchange-rate management, concentrated particularly around the 1985 G-5 Plaza Agreement and the 1987 G-6 Louvre
Accord,5 were thus organized to a considerable degree outside the
summit process. Solomon (1991) has dwelt on the need to treat exchangerate management and international cooperation as separate issues.
Secretary Brady (1990, p. 5) has even stated flatly that “the G7 policy
process is not fundamentally about exchange rates,” although he also
called the process “successful in . . . promoting exchange market stability.” Nevertheless, exchange-market objectives and international
policy coordination are inseparable, at least in the sense that the choice
of exchange-rate regime very much influences the demand for international policy coordination (see Kenen, 1989).6 A high degree of turbulence in exchange markets, in turn, might bring exchange-rate stability
to the attention of the summit and the G-7.
The results reported in Table 1 may be used to test the derivativecorrection hypothesis in the area of exchange rates as well. Commitments to stabilize exchange rates were sufficiently specific to be scored
in 1978 at Bonn and in 1979 at Tokyo, but only the Tokyo summit
followed a period of rapidly increasing exchange-rate instability. As was
shown in column 1 of Table 1, the average variance rose slightly less
than 0.2 percent daily between the 1977 and 1978 summits to slightly
more than 0.3 percent daily between the 1978 and 1979 summits, after
5

The G-5 countries are the G-7 countries minus Canada and Italy. Italy boycotted
the G-7 Louvre meeting, making it a meeting of six finance ministers. A fascinating
account of the entire period from Plaza to Louvre is given by Funabashi (1988).
Reflections on its systemic significance are found in Bergsten (1990, pp. 22-23). A most
thorough evaluation of attempts at exchange-rate management during this period is given
in Obstfeld (1990).
6
The systemic element in the use of an exchange-rate regime and of exchange-rate
targets as surrogates for international cooperation is emphasized also in Kenen (1990) as
well as in earlier writings such as Williamson and Miller (1987), Hughes Hallett,
Holtham, and Hutson (1989), and Minford (1989). Hughes Hallett (1987, p. 368) wrote
that, “cooperation on shared [exchange-rate] targets, whether explicitly or implicitly, . . .
is a key element in coordinating policies between countries.” His conclusion was based
on a study of seven multi-country models that showed policies and their outcomes to be
highly sensitive to the priorities or the ideal values assigned to the shared exchange-rate
targets.
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having shown little change earlier. In the period after the May 1985
Bonn summit and before the Plaza Agreement in September that year,
the measure of exchange-rate instability rose to 0.7 percent daily. This
clearly represented a peak for the floating-rate period. Volatility then fell
progressively to less than half that peak value in the two succeeding
years, which included the February 1987 Louvre Accord. Between the
1987 Venice and the 1990 Houston summits, exchange-rate instability
remained lower than at almost any time since 1979, even though public
references to the Louvre Accord and its implied target zones became
increasingly rare. Issues that fade from the summit agenda thus appear
to be victims of success, whether that success is attributable to accident
or design.7
The record thus provides some support for the mundane notion that
issues giving no particular and immediate discomfort are unlikely to
receive sustained attention at a summit and are quickly downgraded by
the G-7. The most recent statistics on exchange-rate instability, for
instance, may bear little relation to what is in store for the future and
to any prospective damage exchange-rate uncertainty may inflict on
international trade, finance, and growth (for discussion, see Bini Smaghi,
1990). Yet, it is recent experience, not the longer-term outlook, that
appears to create most concern.
All of this implies that the summit process should not be expected to
conceive and incubate systemic change. The most it can be expected to
contribute to fundamental reform is to provide some support for
negotiations already scheduled. This it can do by pressing for decision
deadlines and for the timely completion and ratification of documents
once an agenda has been set elsewhere for restructuring and governing
the international economic and financial system.
7

Krugman (1990, p. 21) has concluded: “In retrospect, the apparent success of the
G-7 at enforcing target zones after the Louvre appears to have been something of a
fluke.” Dobson (1991, pp. 102-118) provides a more favorable assessment of G-7
attempts to herd exchange rates into those zones.
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5 SUMMIT AMBITION AND EFFECT:
STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF SCORES
To evaluate the scores reported in the next chapter, we need information on the distribution to expect when outcomes and scores are
affected not only by the degree of effort countries make to live up to
their commitments, but by stochastic disturbances as well. Scores that
are a linear function of the degree of compliance, as are those used
here, are convenient for deriving the average scores and standard
deviations expected in a stochastic environment. Without such information, it will be difficult to test any hypotheses about the actual average
scores. Placing the actual (sample) averages of the scores assigned to
the 209 commitments (or to subgroups thereof) in a grid of expected
(population) values calculated under a range of stipulations identifies
the conditions most compatible with the observed results.1
The Statistics to be Derived and Their Uses
In the previous chapters, we have given examples and explained the
meanings of individual scores. A score of 0 given to an economic
outcome that was the subject of an undertaking indicates that there
was no movement toward or away from the undertaking. Economic
outcomes, however, are subject to random disturbances as well as to
policy influences. An interpretation based on sample point estimates is,
therefore, not sufficient. We must examine the theoretical distribution
of scores and use their standard deviation to determine whether any
sample average score differs significantly from 0. Because the number
of undertakings is small in many categories, obtaining statistical parameters from theoretical distributions, rather than from sample distributions, will aid in the analysis of sample-specific results.
The statistics used for testing are found to be dependent on (1) the
degree of ambition revealed in a summit undertaking, measured by the
size of the shift in the prior distribution of the target variable, and (2)
the degree to which countries may be deemed to produce the actual
summit effects to satisfy their obligations, despite an uncontrollable
1
As this task is quite technical, some readers may wish to proceed to the results
without delay. They may skip the rest of this chapter, although they are still invited to
read the overview that follows.
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stochastic element preventing exact fulfillment. The distribution of
summit scores is thus a function of both the ambition reflected in the
undertaking and the effort expended on nudging the expected outcome
toward the one promised.
This double dependency can be visualized as follows. Consider a
commitment that is entirely lacking in ambition to change the status
quo, and assume that no effort is made to do so.2 Then the commitment does not open up a range of ambition within which a country can
expect to earn partial credit for moving toward a goal, and compliance
scores can take on only one of two values, depending on the direction
in which stochastic disturbances happen to go. If deviations to one side
are judged to be good and to the other side bad, outcomes receiving a
score of 1 will alternate randomly with outcomes receiving a score of
−1, for an expected average score of 0. Hence, the standard deviation
of the individual scores is 1 and that of their mean is equal to the
inverse of the square root of the degrees of freedom. The latter,
therefore, becomes the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the
average score reflects “no summit ambition” and “no summit effect.”
This test statistic is used later in this study to assess the significance of
average scores.
If the joint null can be rejected, we might want to know with which
account of summit ambition and effect the sample statistics most
closely agree. For this purpose, consider another case in which ambition and strength are again of equal strength but are not both zero.
The aim is to shift the target variable by an amount equal to two
standard deviations in the desired direction, say, toward lower inflation,
and the effort is sufficient to secure that result in the absence of
stochastic disturbances. Finally, suppose that the stochastic disturbances
are normally distributed around the target value so that it is equal to the
inflation rate expected with the summit effect. Under these assumptions,
one would expect half the scores to be precisely 1, because there is a
50-percent chance that inflation will be found to have been reduced by
at least as much as the amount promised. There will be a 50-percent
chance of getting a score of less than 1, including a 2.3-percent chance
of getting a negative score, if inflation should rise instead of fall in
response to an extremely unfavorable random disturbance. But the
lower-limit value of −1 would be exceedingly rare, for that score would
2

Even an unambitious commitment that does not propose to change the most likely
or modal outcome can offer assurances that substantial deviations will not be tolerated.
Such a commitment can therefore provide risk-reduction services, which are ignored here.
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be recorded only for outcomes four or more standard deviations above
the value of the inflation rate expected with the assumed degree of
effort. Hence, most score values are much closer together than in the
previous case. All told, the expected value of the average score for this
case would therefore be somewhat less than 1 (0.80), and the standard
deviation of scores would be much smaller (0.29).
We use these and other values3 to form a grid for matching the
small-sample averages and standard deviations obtained from the 209
scores with the population values derived under specified assumptions.
The matching combination is used to identify those assumptions about
summit ambition and effect that best fit the data.
A Random Walk with Allowance for Policy Effects
Because the summit process moves in annual increments, its undertakings typically refer to what is to be accomplished by the time of the
next summit, at which point a new determination will be made. It is thus
not too restrictive to assume that a variable that is the subject of an
undertaking follows a random walk that may or may not be displaced
by a summit effect, c. Although c is assigned experimentally, u is a
normally distributed error term with mean of 0 and standard deviation
u, which brings random innovations into the process:
xt

xt-1

ct

u t.

(1)

In the experiments the results of which are reported below, c is
calibrated in standard units of u to show how large any summit effect
is assumed to be in relation to the step-ahead normal deviation in the
target variable, x, from time t to t − 1. Let Xt denote the goal specified
for the target variable in the summit declaration made at time t − 1.
Then ct may, of course, turn out to differ systematically from Xt − xt−1,
most often because the strength of the summit effect will be less than
promised.
The first row of Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of
scores derived under the null hypothesis that c is 0, that is, that nothing
is changed by the summits. In all but the first case, however, there are
ambitious undertakings; countries have committed themselves to
shifting the prior distribution of outcomes by one or two standard
3

The values are calculated by statistical procedures mapping an outcome distribution,
which may have been shifted by summit effort, into a distribution of scores, given that
the values of the scores rise linearly over the range set by summit ambition. The
calculations are shown in the Appendix for the combination of cases listed in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
POPULATION VALUES OF THE AVERAGE SCORE AND OF THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF
SCORES (IN PARENTHESES) CALCULATED FOR HYPOTHETICAL UNDERTAKINGS OF RISING
DEGREES OF AMBITION AND EFFECT
(scores range from −1 to 1)
Summit Ambition
−u

0
0
Summit
Effect
(c)

0
(1)

−u
−2u

−2u

0
(0.7184)

0
(0.4797)

0.6097
(0.5548)

0.4586
(0.4326)
0.8006
(0.2919)

SOURCE: Appendix.
NOTE: “Summit ambition” is the difference between the level of the variable targeted
for time t, Xt and its actual prior level, xt−1. The actual effort yielding the “summit effect”
is equal to ct in equation (1) or to what the change in x from t − 1 to t would be in the
absence of stochastic disturbances, ut. Both summit ambition and effect are calibrated in
terms of (inflation) reductions equal to specified standard deviations of u, −u. The mean
and standard deviation of the scores expected for the six combinations of summit ambition and effect identified above are shown in the body of the table.

deviations of the target variable u in the desired direction. Now, if x is
something undesirable, like inflation, but Xt is set so as to require no
reduction in inflation from its level at time t − 1, as in the first case
considered, there can be only two scores, each with a probability of
one-half: 1, if xt should fall below Xt, and −1, if the opposite should
occur. The population values of the average score, A, and standard
deviation, SD, are therefore 0 and 1, respectively, as was noted earlier
in connection with testing the joint null hypothesis.
Corresponding values for the five other cases in Table 3 indicate
that, except when c is zero, so that A is also zero, the average score, A,
is greater the more ambitious the undertaking and the more completely
it is fulfilled. For the standard deviation, the situation is exactly the
reverse. SD falls as ambition rises, even if c is 0, and falls again the
more completely the undertakings are fulfilled. Explanations follow.
The smallest mean and largest variance in Table 3 are encountered
when the undertaking is merely to repeat the status quo, and nothing
more is done. If the goal, Xt, is more ambitious to start with, specifying
a reduction in inflation by 2u, for example, but c, and hence the
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average score, has remained zero, the standard deviation of that score
will be smaller. The scores will not jump abruptly from −1 to 1 at the
point where xt xt−1, but will rise gradually from one extreme to the
other, passing the zero value at the “no-change” point, and this will
reduce the number of scores whose absolute value is expected to be 1.
When the aim is to repeat the status quo, the number of extreme
scores is equal to N, the total number of observations; when the aim is
to reduce inflation by 2u, it falls to 0.05N, as partial fulfillment and
partial failure can now be recognized over a wide range. In the positive
half of this range opened up by ambitious targeting, scores will be
rising linearly from 0 for the status quo, xt
xt−1, to 1 for complete
success, xt Xt xt−1 − 2u. By symmetry, they will not fall to −1 until
the inflation rate, xt, has climbed to xt−1
2u. Figure A-1 in the
Appendix helps visualize the distributions of outcomes and how they
are scored, thereby yielding the distribution of scores.
If undertakings are highly ambitious, shifting the prior distribution of
the target variable by many standard deviations, and the strength of
these undertakings is matched by the strength of the summit effects,
scores substantially below 1 will be rare. Their average will thus approach 1 and their standard deviation, 0. Generally, however, we
expect to be far away from such a combination, and even making the
exact effort called for in an undertaking can yield scores that are far
from perfect when outcomes are beset by random disturbances.
If we could determine which of the cases in Table 3 most closely
resembles the combination of ambition and effect of the N summit
undertakings in a particular area, we could choose the statistics appropriate for testing the significance of deviations of the sample average,
a, from the population average, A, by using the formula
a−A

t (SD)/(N − 1)0.5.

(2)

In particular, if A 0 and SD 1 because the null hypothesis of “no
summit effect” is to be tested jointly with the hypothesis of “no summit
ambition,” the sample average, a, can simply be divided by the standard
deviation of the mean, here the inverse of the square root of the degrees
of freedom, N − 1. The result will be the value of the t-statistic that
determines the significance level of the deviation from 0. For example,
suppose there are only seventeen scores to average, and a significance
level of 5 percent has been chosen. The critical value of t, then, will be
2.12, and the critical value of the sample average, 0.53. Hence, it is not
easy to reject this joint null hypothesis with just a few observations.
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Summit Ambition and Forecasting Accuracy
We have shown that the theoretical distribution of scores and its mean
and standard deviation depend on a combination of summit ambition
and summit effect. These two parameters can be estimated, and we
illustrate the procedure for undertakings to reduce inflation, which, at
40 percent of the total number of commitments scored, constitute by
far the largest single group of undertakings.
Inflation, measured by the GNP or GDP deflator, is one of the
variables forecasted for the S-7 in the semiannual OECD Economic
Outlook, which usually appears in June or July, near the time of the
summit. Inflation is forecasted for successive half years, ending with
the second half of the calendar year, for a total of three half years.
OECD forecasts can thus be obtained by taking the square root of the
product of 1 plus the annualized inflation rate in each of the two
adjoining half years and then taking the square root of the product of
the two resulting geometric averages. This estimate is centered on
developments from the last half of the summit year to the first half of
the next year, to correspond with the period associated with the summit undertakings as closely as the data allow.4
Because the OECD forecasts of inflation and our calibration of
summit undertakings were conducted independently, summit commitments to reduce inflation may sometimes prove less ambitious than
reductions implied by the OECD forecasts.5 In 67 out of 84 cases (80
percent), however, summit ambition was positive relative to the OECD
4
For example, in July 1983, the OECD forecasted for Japan annualized inflation of
0.0175 percent from the first half (I) to the second half (II) of 1983, 0.0225 percent
from 1983:II to 1984:I, and 0.025 percent from 1984:I to 1984:II. The square root of
1.0175(1.0225) 1.02000 and the square root of 1.0225(1.025) 1.02375. Both of these
estimates contain the forecasted inflation rate from 1983:II to 1984:I. Taking the square
root of 1.02000(1.02375) and subtracting 1 yields 2.19 percent as the estimate of the
OECD forecast of inflation that can be related to the 1983 summit undertakings in this
area. In most years, such undertakings related to annual rates of change in the GNP or
GDP deflator from the third quarter of the summit year to the same quarter of the next
calendar year. Details are provided in the authors’ unpublished appendix, available upon
request (see Chapter 3, note 5).
5
Committing to something less than the improvement forecasted need be neither
meaningless nor worthless. Because forecasts relate to expected values of stochastic
variables, such commitments may serve to limit or insure against large negative deviations by promising counteraction should they threaten to occur.
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forecast. Averaging over all of these commitments, ambition is therefore
positive and equal to an average reduction in the annual inflation rate
by 1.73 percentage points from the level forecasted by the OECD.
Because the standard deviation of the actual S-7 inflation rates was 6.05
percent in the years for which summit commitments were made about
them, the commitment is therefore to shift the distribution of inflation
rates down by 0.3 standard deviations relative to the OECD forecast.
The average degree of ambition for the subset of 67 undertakings
displaying positive ambition relative to the OECD forecast is to reduce
inflation by 2.52 percentage points. The average score for those undertakings is 0.227, meaning that the effect achieved is equal to about
one-fifth of the ambition.
This result is very similar to that reported in Chapter 6 for undertakings to reduce inflation, although such reductions are measured there
from the most recent levels rather than those forecasted by the OECD.
For the S-7 commitments analyzed in Chapter 6, the intended reduction
in inflation6 averages 2.53 percentage points, which amounts to 0.4 of
the standard deviation of their inflation rates. The average score is
0.222, again indicating fulfillment by little more than one-fifth. With 84
such undertakings, this score is just barely significantly different from 0
at the 5-percent level under the joint null hypothesis of no summit
ambition and effect. Under this hypothesis, the standard error of the
average score would be equal to 0.110; it is the square root of a fraction equal to 1 (which is the standard deviation of scores shown in the
first entry of Table 3) divided by the number of degrees of freedom
(which is one less than the number of observations).
Although the linear scoring scheme credits summit undertakings on
inflation with having been honored at least to a small degree, summit
undertakings are not better forecasts than those of the OECD. The
root mean square error (RMSE) is even slightly higher for the summit
“ideal” than for the OECD forecast when both are compared with
actual inflation in the period following each summit; the RMSE values
are 5.10 and 4.72 percent, respectively. Hence, there is no support for
the hypothesis that the inside or advance knowledge generated in the
final stages of preparation for a summit would give the summit declarations an advantage over the OECD forecasts prepared somewhat
6

Because summit participants did not usually have available the GNP/GDP deflators
for the second quarter just ending or ended, the status quo on which summit undertakings were calibrated is defined in most cases as the rate of inflation from the first
quarter of the year preceding a particular summit to the first quarter of the summit year.
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earlier and published usually in July. In this area, at least, we find no
support for the assumption that national governments are better
forecasters than other technically qualified groups, including international organizations, or for the assumption that information exchange
among governments is a valuable consequence of international collaboration or even its main benefit (as Humpage, 1990, has asserted, based
on his review of the literature).
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6

RESULTS FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMITS
FROM 1975 TO 1989

As explained in Chapter 5, sample averages are needed to assess the
predictive accuracy, and hence credibility, of summit commitments.
Furthermore, the greater the number of scores averaged, the more
conclusive that statistic can become. By the same token, summit
commitments differ not only by occasion, country, and economic area,
with promises of change necessarily tailored to the circumstances and
prospects of each country, but by the importance that summit participants
attach to issues from case to case. Hence, averaging also has its limits.
The compromise chosen here in reporting and analyzing scores for
undertakings similar to those in Table 2 is to present both overall
averages and averages for particular groups. First, simple averages and
an experimentally weighted set of averages are shown for each of the
fifteen summits. Then, scores are combined by summit but separated
by either country or issue.
In almost any summary evaluation of multiple dimensions of performance, scores tend to be averaged over measures referring to different
capabilities. The context will determine whether an average is intended
to give a reading on a complex factor-loading of attributes or to record
the mean outcome of repeated tries. Obviously, one must average
apples and oranges in some way if the question is about the average
number of calories a person has obtained from fruit. In the same way,
the heterogeneity of summit undertakings scored is not troublesome if
the purpose of score averages is to throw light on the singular issue of
credibility. It is commonly observed that truthfulness can be established
quite well by observing how potential partners act in little things, not
just in big things. The degree of truthfulness can carry over from one
issue to another because it pertains to the character of the actor or the
process, not just to a particular event.
Scores by Summit
Simple and weighted averages of linear scores are shown for each of
the first fifteen summits in Table 4. Application of the experimental
weighting scheme involves three steps: (1) The average score received
by each of the S-7 countries on its individual (“single-country”) undertakings is weighted by the proportion of that country’s 1980 GNP (or
34

SIMPLE-

TABLE 4
WEIGHTED-AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE FIRST FIFTEEN SUMMITS
(population values of standard deviations in parentheses)

AND

Summit

Date

Number
of Scores

Rambouillet
San Juan
London I
Bonn I
Tokyo I
Venice I
Ottawa
Versailles
Williamsburg
London II
Bonn II
Tokyo II
Venice II
Toronto
Paris

11/75
6/76
5/77
7/78
6/79
6/80
7/81
6/82
5/83
6/84
5/85
6/86
6/87
6/88
7/89

9
16
10
26
15
14
12
15
19
20
14
4
8
14
13

All Combined

209

Simple
Average
0.408
0.351
0.381
0.343
0.623
0.159
0.266
0.823
0.066
0.352
0.200
0.765
0.857
−0.450
0.187

Weighted
Averagea

(0.669)
(0.575)
(0.596)
(0.693)
(0.640)
(0.610)
(0.815)
(0.316)
(0.662)
(0.578)
(0.674)
(0.237)
(0.259)
(0.628)
(0.701)

0.566
0.306
0.093
0.386
0.791
0.035
0.234
0.852
−0.104
0.426
−0.014
0.592
0.938
−0.580
0.109

0.317 (0.688)

0.280

SOURCE: Unpublished appendix available from authors (see Chapter 3, note 5).
a
The country weights, corresponding to the seven countries’ dollar-valued 1980
GDP, are 0.423 for the United States, 0.164 for Japan, 0.127 for Germany, 0.103
for France, 0.072 for the United Kingdom, 0.070 for Italy, and 0.041 for Canada.

GDP) to the 1980 GNP (or GDP) of all the S-7 countries combined. If
all countries have not engaged in single-country commitments at a
particular summit, weights are scaled to sum to 1 for those that have.
Combining these weighted scores, we obtain the weighted-average
score for all the single-country undertakings made at a particular
summit, with the weights reflecting the importance of the country
making the commitment. (2) The proportions of all single-country and
multi-country undertakings made at a particular summit are used to
weight (a) the weighted-average score derived by (1), and (b) the
average score obtained for all multi-country commitments. (3) The sum
of (a) and (b), so weighted, is the overall weighted-average score for a
particular summit. The weighted-average score deviates from the
simple-average score unsystematically, depending mostly on the extent
to which the average score for the largest country, the United States,
differs from those for the other S-7 countries.
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Table 4 shows that the number of undertakings that can be scored
ranges from a high of 26 for Bonn I (1978) down to only 4 for Tokyo
II (1986). The average scores differ greatly by summit, ranging from
0.8 or more for Versailles (1982) and Venice (1987) to low or negative
readings for Williamsburg (1983) and Toronto (1988). These scores,
which are intended to measure only the degree of compliance with
specific summit undertakings in the area of macroeconomics and energy,
may not correlate closely with the degree of “success” attributed to the
summits by those who rate them on other grounds.
Former German Chancellor Schmidt (1985, p. 126), for instance,
rates the first economic summit as “probably the best.” With the press
kept at a distance, he wrote, “we had to concentrate on our five partners,”
and we left Rambouillet “with the feeling that we were thus better able
to cooperate with one another.” Yet, the performance score shown for
the undertakings of the 1975 summit (Table 4) is not far above the
overall average. Putnam and Bayne (1987, p. 135) described Versailles
as the first “failed” summit, because it left very bad feelings, but then
added that “Versailles would prove to be a substantive success, though
a procedural failure” (p. 140). They concluded that the next summit,
Williamsburg, was a success when “measured against lowered expectations” (p. 181), yet we have given Williamsburg a very low compliance
score. Indeed, unusually high scores at one summit, such as those for
Tokyo I (1979), Versailles (1982), and Venice II (1987), tend to be
followed by unusually low scores at the next, without, however, suggesting an entirely firm pattern. In addition, there appears to be no
systematic relation at all between the number of undertakings that can
be scored in a particular summit declaration and the level of the
average scores for that summit.
Although summits have been rated informally by others, no one
appears to have made summary ratings of the credibility of commitments by individual country. Yet the political circumstances of national
governments may differ in ways that bear on their willingness and
ability to deliver. If commitments are made at a summit primarily to
strengthen a government’s hand against political opposition in its own
country—be it opposition from within the ruling coalition, other
branches of government, or beyond—performance risk is high, for the
commitments would not be supported by a prior national consensus.
Hence, the national policy regime and performance on international
commitments need not be independent (as Roubini and Sachs, 1989,
and Eichengreen, 1992, have shown). All the same, because the
strength and resolution of governments in several summit countries has
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clearly changed dramatically during the fifteen-year period considered,
we shall not pursue such political theories or project them onto particular
countries.
Unsupported Conjectures
It is interesting to note that common conjectures related, not to variables
of domestic governance, but to (1) differences in international exposure,
(2) problems in assigning responsibility for the production of public
goods, or (3) the technical controllability of outcomes, receive no
support from the pattern of scores in Table 5. For example:
Conjecture 1. Asymmetries in the degree to which countries can visit
macroeconomic externalities upon each other depend largely on their
economic size. These differences in exposure relate, in turn, to differences in the degree to which the S-7 countries can exert effective
pressure on each other (see Dobson, 1991, p. 127). Because large
countries are not nearly as concerned with the undertakings of small
countries as small countries are with large, small countries attempt to
gain leverage over large countries by scrupulously honoring their
commitments. By setting a good example, they may hope to strengthen
respect for international commitments generally. This is the opposite
presumption from that made about small members of a cartel, who
may be inclined to cheat because of their relative impunity. The reason
for the difference is that, in the area of international macroeconomic
policy coordination, small countries can reduce their vulnerability by
boosting the international coordination process and its egalitarian
elements. They invest in the process by strict adherence to commitments and by refusing to take advantage, through cheating, of their
comparative lack of influence on the collective outcome.
Evidence. No systematic pattern of asymmetry by size of country is
supported by the data. The smallest (by GDP) of the S-7 countries,
Canada, has the second-highest score, after the United Kingdom,
whereas the second smallest, Italy, has a low score. The two largest
countries, the United States and Japan, have low scores, but not as low
as France, which is much smaller. The evidence thus appears unkind to
any theory linking the degree of performance simply to the size of the
countries measured by GNP.
Conjecture 2. Multi-country undertakings, to which every country is
to contribute, are likely to be honored less closely than single-country
undertakings because diffusion of accountability creates free-rider
problems. Unless assignments can be parceled out clearly, so that the
contribution key is fixed, countries will not provide adequately for the
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND NUMBER OF SCORES
UNDERTAKINGS, 1975-1989
Average

SD

FOR

SUMMIT

N

(N − 1)−0.5a

By Country, by Size of 1980 GNP
United States
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada

0.286
0.269
0.340
0.239
0.411
0.281
0.391

0.707
0.649
0.739
0.613
0.757
0.680
0.662

33
29
24
24
21
27
26

0.177
0.189
0.209
0.209
0.224
0.196
0.200

All Undertakings
All Single-Country
All Multi-Country

0.317
0.313
0.349

0.688
0.689
0.681

209
184
25

0.069
0.074
0.204

By Function and Controllability
Real GNP Growth
Demand Composition
International Trade
Fiscal Adjustments
Interest Rate
Inflation Rate
Foreign-Exchange Rate
Aid and Schedules
Energy
All
All
All
All

Direct Policy Measures
Other Measures
Except Energy
Except Inflation

0.432
0.268
0.758
0.263
0.266
0.222
−0.720
0.265
0.668

0.625
0.825
0.358
0.692
0.547
0.727
0.281
0.388
0.558

18
7
7
40
21
84
2
5
25

0.243
0.408
0.408
0.160
0.224
0.110
1.000
0.500
0.204

0.278
0.319
0.269
0.381

0.635
0.691
0.690
0.653

10
199
184
125

0.333
0.071
0.074
0.090

SOURCE: Unpublished appendix available from authors (see Chapter 3,
note 5).
a
Standard deviation (SD) of the average score under the joint null
hypothesis that the population value of the SD of scores is 1 because
summit ambition and effect are both 0.

production of public goods. Hence, collective undertakings that cannot
easily be refracted into national obligations may receive less compliance than undertakings singling out particular nations.
Evidence. Average scores differ little between multi-country and
single-country undertakings. Indeed, the average level of scores shown
in Table 5 is (insignificantly) higher for commitments of the collective
kind. Multi-country commitments have referred to achieving greater
energy independence or higher economic growth for the S-7 countries
as a group and to reducing current-account imbalances and exchangerate volatility between them. They have also involved calls for the
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timely completion of international negotiations and agreements in
which the S-7 are centrally involved. Even though the public-goods
aspects of such multi-country undertakings are thus quite apparent, the
degree of compliance has been no less than for commitments that
could be assigned specifically to individual countries, such as commitments to reduce inflation and fiscal deficits.
Conjecture 3. Undertakings that specify the use of policy instruments
are likely to be fulfilled to a greater degree than undertakings that are
more dependent on economic processes and macroeconomic interactions
with the private sector. As Putnam and Henning (1989, p. 102) have
noted, participants in international coordination came to appreciate the
superiority of agreements that specified policy moves, rather than
economic outcomes, about a decade ago, presumably because they could
manage the former more closely than the latter. Kenen (1989, p. 89) also
advises governments “to frame their commitments in terms of their policy
instruments, rather than the mixture of targets and instruments currently
used by the G-7 governments.”1 Indeed, Kenen (1990, p. 66) regards
“commitments about instruments” as “the distinguishing feature of
coordination, setting it apart from other forms of economic cooperation.”
Evidence. Table 5 shows a lower score for commitments involving
direct policy measures than for all other undertakings. Hence, the data
do not support the idea that commitments are more credible when
limited to measures governments can control directly. Rather, governments appear to have at least as much difficulty adopting the policy
measures promised as they have with forecasting other developments and
their effects on target variables endogenous to the economic system.
Nevertheless, the detail by function in Table 5 suggests that pledges
about variables that are subject to a large variety of extrinsic shocks or
to intrinsic instability may be otiose. Commitments to “greater exchangerate stability,” which receive a negative score, are a case in point. Yet,
even those commitments relating to energy production and consumption
that do not involve direct policy measures are subject to long-term policy
influences. These may have made the outcome of such commitments
relatively controllable.
In any event, the degree to which energy commitments have been
fulfilled in the past stands out from commitments in all other areas. The
figures in the last column of Table 5 represent the population values of
1

Williamson and Miller (1987, p. 64) classify the 10 variables suggested at the 1986
Tokyo summit as suitable indicators for international surveillance: 4 are classified as targets,
2 as instruments, 1 as an intermediate target, and 3 as redundant.
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the standard deviations of the average scores under the null hypothesis
that the population values of those scores are 0. Using these values to
test the significance levels of the average scores reported in the first
column, we find that, of the nine functional areas distinguished, only
commitments in the area of energy have received a positive score that
is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This might suggest that
summit pledges are less reliable when they concern standard macroeconomic issues than when they concern reforms that are more microeconomic or “structural” in character, involving a sustained reordering
of competitive conditions and production incentives.
The Low Level of Scores
As reported in Chapter 2, a number of researchers have agreed that
“deals struck at the summit” are highly credible. Our results tend to
contradict that expectation at least with regard to those deals embodied
in economic declarations. Indeed, our most striking finding is the low
average score for compliance with the 209 undertakings extracted from
the first fifteen summit declarations. Contrary to the views of those
representing summit undertakings as substantially honored, though
perhaps ill advised, the combined score is only 0.32. The average score
falls to 0.27 when the 25 distinct undertakings in the field of energy
are omitted. It rises to 0.38 when the 84 undertakings to reduce
inflation are excluded. Under our cardinal scoring methodology, the
results support the conclusion that the macroeconomic undertakings
have been only partly fulfilled, to a degree that is, on average, slightly
less than one-third.
These values are all statistically significant at the 1-percent level,
given that the number of undertakings, taken together, is large enough
to produce a small standard deviation of the mean (less than 0.1). In
other words, we can reject the joint hypothesis of “no summit ambition”
and “no summit effect” when applied to the whole set of commitments.
Nevertheless, the average scores are so low and their scatter so high
that we must question whether the newsworthiness of the summits can
rest mainly on the credibility of the commitments announced in the
economic declarations. The standard deviations of the individual scores
tend to be 0.6 or more in any group and close to 0.7 for the entire set
of scores. Values in this range can be deemed to support the view that
commitments contained in the summit declarations are shots taken in
very poor light, if not entirely in the dark. Indeed, when mapped into
the grid of experimental results laid out in Table 3, a mean of about
0.3 and a standard deviation of 0.7 are consistent with targeting a
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change equal to about one standard deviation from where we would
otherwise expect the variable to be, and achieving considerably less on
average. If the counterfactual economic data without “summit effect”
are generated by a random walk, and, if summit commitments are
meant to bring policy influences to bear on the next step, then the
declarations are credible in moving these data somewhat in the desired
direction, but only barely.2
Why are the scores so low? The explanation may perhaps be found
in the discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the reasons why specific
issues become the subjects of summit commitments. If heads of state
need to be seen as actively confronting the problems most troubling to
their voting public, they cannot readily avoid public promises to deal
with those problems. If their constituents are acutely conscious of a
turn for the worse or of a problem that has continued to fester, it is
difficult not to respond to the common expectation that “something
should be done” at the grand occasion provided by the summit. The
principals will therefore attempt to satisfy such expectations by publicly
offering remedial action or an improved outlook even if the hope for
success is low, but not so low that dismal failure is practically inevitable.
It may be safer for politicians to address macroeconomic distress in
their declarations, even with a risk of failing, than to be seen as not
being able or caring enough to try at all.
2
If the average score were low, say 0.3, but the standard deviation of scores were
equally low, say 0.1, then the public would learn to take each grain of commitment with
a little over two grains of salt. Dividing any change promised by 10/3 could then come
close to netting out the true commitments underlying any particular announcement.
Hence, any announcements made with a known and steady degree of exaggeration could
be credible even if the average degree of compliance is predictably small. In fact,
however, the dispersion of the individual scores was found to be generally much larger
than their mean, so that little understanding would be gained by “deflating” all commitments uniformly by their average degree of compliance.
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7

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Much in this study deals with words in a new way that can be relevant
to an analysis of international compacts in other fields. Most important
obligations between nations, such as peace treaties or treaties of
mutual assistance or cooperation, are couched principally in words
rather than numbers. Invariably, the undertakings or goals agreed to
are vague in at least some respects, but this does not make them
unimportant or unsuitable for verification through methodical work.
To express vagueness in a calculable way, we have used membership
functions to define the content of these goals and of the obligations they
have imposed, thereby allowing deviations to be scored in terms of
relative success or failure. Clearly, we cannot have avoided subjective
judgment altogether in identifying the substance of an undertaking and
couching it in a form suitable for continuous scoring. We have also
made choices about the mathematical scoring functions and about the
intervals over which they should be fitted. As in any assessment of
compliance or achievement, however, confidence in the fairness and
consistency of a chosen procedure may be enhanced by knowing, first,
what it is and, second, how it is applied.
Despite a residual subjective element in our “best judgment,” we
doubt that any other group of researchers would rate the overall record
of compliance very differently if their scoring were disciplined by the
same basic approach. That approach starts with an interpretation of the
text of the economic declarations, and not with prejudgments or
impressions gained elsewhere. It then audits the commitments in order
to provide information on what deserve to be called the stylized facts
about the degree of compliance. Establishing that degree empirically is
important in assessing the quality of the commitment. If there is only
low compliance with the economic declaration, which is the centerpiece
of the summit and one of the most prominent public documents
through which international coordination can work and accountability
be established, the declaration cannot be considered credible or very
important regardless of what one may think about the wisdom of its
prescriptions or predictions.
Public perceptions are important, but so are the facts that ultimately
form them. A recent study of international opinion surveys (Wertman
and Smith, 1989) found that a clear majority of those interviewed in
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S-7 countries other than the United States considered it very, or at
least fairly, important to coordinate policies closely with the United
States. United States commentators do not necessarily reciprocate the
sentiment. Feldstein (1988, p. 9), for instance, has advised that “the
process of international cooperation in macroeconomic and exchange
rate management” be shut down because it can be harmful. Others,
such as Brady (1990), have been much more positive. Obviously,
opinions about the usefulness of summits differ greatly, although it is
not clear on what evidence such views turn.
When heads of government confer, there is no such thing as “just
talk,” although there are undoubtedly stretches of idleness and wasted
motion to be traversed.1 Like talk, fuzzy declarations can be full of
meaning and implications. The wording of declarations, unlike conversations, is most carefully considered. Indeed, even if the goals congealed
in the writs of the summit could be made entirely crisp, the concrete
obligations and means of implementation would still need to remain
fuzzy in at least some respects. Sovereigns may plan a joint campaign,
but they do not accept strict marching orders or meticulous commandments from each other, even when some are obviously more powerful
than others.
Fuzziness and credibility are both essential to agreement under these
conditions. Indeed, the greater the credibility of the basic intentions,
the fuzzier an announcement can be without depriving it of informational content (see Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). The importance of
trust can, in turn, be increased by not trying to be overly precise,
means-specific, or exhaustive. Indeed, the choice of generality directs
attention to the overall spirit of an undertaking and to the culture of
coordination in which it arose.
The summit process is an important part and symbol of this culture
of coordination. At the same time, the fact that undertakings remain
largely unfulfilled means that the process has as yet acquired little
binding force and that fuzziness and credibility have not been supporting
each other in this regard. Rather, the low level of credibility may have
made fuzziness indicative of a lack of commitment. If “effective institutions raise the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection” (North, 1991, p. 98), and the economic declarations are the main
institutional product of the summit process, the product has yet to
prove itself as deserving of much credit with the public.
1
Malkin’s (1987, pp. 258-261) deadly, almost first-hand account of the supine
proceedings at the 1982 Versailles summit makes this depressingly clear.

43

This skeptical conclusion is the result of a large amount of empirical
work with both words and numbers, not the consequence of a quick
helping of economic ideology or game-theoretic hypotheses. We hope
that our work will stimulate interest in future studies to determine not
just what international coordination can do, but what it has done, by
what means, and why it may have done much less than its proponents
have believed.
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APPENDIX: MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF SCORES
EXPECTED UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS

This Appendix explains how the hypothetical sample means and standard
deviations of scores shown in Table 3 of Chapter 5 are calculated
under various conditions. Because the statistical specifications and the
procedure for deriving population values are quite general, the work
may of interest beyond its immediate area of application.
The cases selected to establish a grid of reference values are identified
in Table A-1 below. They are distinguished by the strength of the
undertaking targeted and the effect actually achieved. In the three
cases along the principal diagonal, the strength of the actual effect is as
large as targeted, but in all other cases it is less. Effects targeted and
achieved are represented by reductions in some “bad,” such as inflation, measured in multiples of their step-ahead standard deviations, u.
Except in cases 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, where the summit effect (c) is 0 and
the status quo undisturbed, the normal distribution of stochastic
outcomes is assumed to shift to the left from the status quo, as shown
in the three lower diagrams in Figure A-1. Scores fall linearly from 1
for fully (or more than fully) achieving the change targeted to 0 for
simply repeating the status quo. They are extended symmetrically to
the negative range for even worse outcomes. The deviations in the
inflation outcomes from their values expected with summit effect, in
step-ahead normal deviates or standard units, z (xt − xt-1 − c)/u, are
shown along the horizontal axes of the case diagrams. The scores
corresponding to the outcomes, whose relative frequency is indicated
by the bell-shaped curves, are shown on the vertical axes. These axes
are always drawn at the level representing the status quo so that the
expected value of the new outcomes lies to the left of the vertical axes
in all cases in which there is a summit effect (c < 0). Reference to the
diagrams is helpful in deriving the mean and standard deviation of the
scores expected in each of the six cases.
Derivation of the Population Values of the Average Scores
Cases 1.1 to 1.3. As can easily be seen from the corresponding
figures, the population mean of scores, A, is 0 as long as there is no
summit effect (c 0).
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OVERVIEW

TABLE A-1
CASES CONSIDERED

OF

Summit Ambition
Xt − xt−1 = −u

Xt − xt−1 = 0
0
Summit
Effect
(c)

1.1

−u

Xt − xt−1 = −2u

1.2

1.3

2.2

2.3

−2u

3.3

NOTE: Table 3 reports results calculated for these six cases.

Case 2.2. If there is a summit effect equal to −u, 50 percent of the
outcomes receive a score of 1 for, say, desirable reductions of inflation
at least as large as u. There is no penalty for doing more than promised.
Another 2.27 percent receive a score of −1 for increases in inflation in
excess of u from its current level (and, therefore, in excess of 2u
from the reduced level promised). In between, scores (s) fall from 1
when the normal deviate (z) is 0, to −1 when the normal deviate, from
the mean of the distribution that was shifted to the left by 1 through
the summit effect, is 2.
These two matching pairs of values for s and z will be used to
translate s into z. To find the expected value of s when s is distributed
according to the frequency function for the normal deviate z, we must
first obtain the parameters of the line segment connecting all intermediate values of s to values of z. The form of this line segment is s a
bz. Substituting the pairs of (s, z) values identified above into this
linear scoring function yields a
1 and b
−1. Hence s can be
replaced by a bz 1 − z in the intermediate range leading from s
−1 (z 2) to s 1 (z 0). The contribution of this range to the value
of the population mean is:
2

⌠ 1 e
⌡
2π
0

z2
2

2

(1

z) dz

⌠ 1 e
⌡
2π
0

z2
2

0.4773

0.0540

dz

1

e

z2 2
2

2π

ⱍ

0

0.3989

0.1324.
The value of the population mean is 0.50 − 0.0227
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0.1324

0.6097.

and s 0.5(1 - z). The contribution of the intermediate range to the
value of the population mean is:
3

⌠ 0.5 e
⌡
1 2π

z2
2

(1

z) dz

0.3012.

The value of the population mean is 0.1587 - 0.0013

0.3012

0.4586.

Case 3.3. Here, the summit effect is again as large as the undertaking,
but both are −2u. Hence, 50 percent of the expected outcomes receive
a score of 1, and practically none receives a score of −1 in a range that
is 4 or more normal deviates away. In the intermediate range, the score
is 1 for z 0, and −1 for z 4, so that a 1, b −0.5, and s 1 −
0.5z. The contribution of the intermediate range to the value of the
population mean is:
4

z2
2

⌠ 1 e
⌡
2π
0

(1

0.5z) dz

The value of the population mean is 0.50

0.3006.

0.3006

0.8006.

Derivation of the Population Values of the Standard Deviations of
Scores
Case 1.1. Because scores must be either 1 or −1 with equal probability in this case of no ambition, the squared differences from the
mean of 0 are 1 for each of the N observations. Hence the variance
and the standard deviation, SD, of the scores are N/N 1.
Case 1.2. The contribution to the variance of the scores that comes
from the extremes, 1 and −1, is 0.3174, the area under the normal
curve beyond the deviates −1 and 1. Between these extremes, the
score, s, equals −z, so that s2
z2. Hence, the contribution to the
variance of scores is:
1

⌠ 1 e
⌡
1 2π
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z2
2

z 2 dz.

Integrating by parts, let:
1

⌠ z e
⌡
1 2π

v
⌠uv′
Then ⌡

uv

1

⌠ 1 e
⌡
1  2π

z2
2

1

dz

e

z2 1
2

ⱍ , and u

2π

z.

1

⌠u′v
corresponds to:
⌡
z2
2


z z dz



z

e

2π
0.4839

z2 1
2

ⱍ

1

1

1
e
2⌠
⌡
2π
0

z2
2

dz

0.6826

0.1987.
The population variance of the score is 0.3174
the standard deviation, SD, is 0.7184.

0.1987

0.5161, and

Case 1.3. The contribution to the variance of the score that comes
from the extremes of 1 and −1 is now reduced to 0.0454, the area
beyond the normal deviates −2 and 2. Between the extremes, the
score, s, is −0.5z, or s2 0.25z2. Hence, the contribution to the variance of scores is:
2

⌠
⌡
2

1

e

z2
2

z 2 dz

0.1847.

4 2π

The population variance of the score is 0.0454
SD is 0.4797.

0.1847

0.2301, so

Case 2.2. The calculation of the population variance of the scores
becomes more difficult when there is a summit effect, so that the
population mean (A) ceases to be zero. Subtracting the population mean
of 0.6097 from the extreme scores of −1 and 1, respectively, makes
their combined contribution to the variance 0.50(1 − 0.6097)2
0.0227(−1 − 0.6097)2 0.1350. Furthermore, in the intermediate range,
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where s 1 − z, s − A 0.3903 − z, so that (s - A)2 0.1523 − 0.7806z
z2. Hence, the contribution to the variance of score is:
2

⌠ 1 e
⌡
2π
0

z2
2

(0.1523

z 2) dz

0.7806z

The population variance is 0.1350

0.1728

0.1728.

0.3078, so SD is 0.5548.

Case 2.3. The mean previously derived for this case was 0.4586.
Given that s
0.5(1 − z), (s − A)2
0.25(0.0828 − z)2
0.0017 −
2
0.0414z 0.25z . Subtracting the mean from the 15.87 percent of cases
receiving a score of 1 and from the 0.13 percent receiving a score of
−1 yields the contribution to the population variance coming from the
extremes. It is 0.1587(1 − 0.4586)2 0.0013(−1 − 0.4586)2 0.0493.
The contribution of scores in the intermediate range is:
3

⌠ 1 e
⌡
1 2π

z2
2

(0.0017

0.0414z

The population variance is 0.0493

0.25z 2) dz

0.1378

0.1378.

0.1871, so SD is 0.4326.

Case 3.3. The value of the population mean is 0.8006, so that the
extreme scores contribute an amount equal to 0.5000(1 − 0.8006)2
0.0000(−1 − 0.8006)2 0.0199. Furthermore, s 1 − 0.5z and (s − A)
0.1994 − 0.5z, so that (s − A)2
0.0398 − 0.1994z
0.25z2. The
contribution of scores in the intermediate range is:
4

⌠ 1 e
⌡
2π
0

z2
2

(0.0398

0.1994z

The population variance is 0.0199

0.25z 2) dz

0.0653
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0.0653.

0.0852, so SD is 0.2919.
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